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Abstract 
Our main task is to study the effect of corporate governance on the market liquidity of lis
ted companies' stocks. We establish a theoretical model that contains the heterogeneity 
of investors’ beliefs to explain the mechanisms by which corporate governance improves 
liquidity of the corporate stocks. In this process we found that the existence of noise trad
ers who are semi-informed in the market is an important condition for corporate governa
nce to have the effect of improving liquidity of the stocks. We further find that the streng
th of this effect is affected by the degree of noise traders' participation in market transac
tions. Our model reveals that corporate governance and the degree of noise traders' parti
cipation in transactions have a synergistic effect on improving the liquidity of the stocks. 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define that the purpose of corporate governance is a series 
of constraints and institutional arrangements formulated to solve the two types of agency
 conflicts and protect the interests of investors. 
The liquidity of stocks studied in most of the existing literature refers to the liquidity of
 stocks in the secondary market. The liquidity that we focus on in this paper is also the li
quidity of stocks in the secondary market. According to Harris (1990), a security is  said t
o have higher liquidity if it can be sold in large quantities at lower transaction costs in a s
hort period of time and its market price is less affected. The level of stock market liquidit
y determines the level of utility investors get in their investments, so it also affects their i
nvestment decisions. Therefore, Securities liquidity has been a research hotspot in the fin
ancial market field, and a large number of related classic literatures have emerged, such 
as: Amihud (1986, 2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
Liu (2006),  Amihud and Hameed et al. (2015), etc. If an investor holds a security that h
as lower liquidity, he has to sell it at a price significantly lower than the true value of the 
security when for some reason he needs to sell it in large quantities within a short period
 of time, as will bring him a greater loss. For securities with better liquidity, the holder ca
n  sell a larger number of such securities at a price close to its fair value in a short period
 of time, without causing a significant decline in the price of such securities. When the pr
ospects of the securities market are not optimistic and investors are not confident, a larg
e number of securities will be sold off, which will cause the prices of various securities in 
the market to decrease. When the prospects of the securities market are not optimistic a
nd investors are not confident, a large number of securities will be sold off, which will ca
use the  prices of various securities in the market to fall. But at this time, the prices of se
curities with higher liquidity tend to have a slighter decrease, so such securities play a rol
e in stabilizing the market in decline. 
Since 2002, more and more literature has begun to focus on the relationship between 
corporate governance and micro characteristics that the corporate stocks exhibit in mark
et transactions. Gompers and Ishii et al. (2003), Aggarwal et al. (2009), Bebchuk and Co
hen et al. (2009), Johnson, Moorman et al. (2011), etc. find that the return on the stocks
 of companies with better  protection of investor rights has a higher premium and the co
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mpany's market value is also higher. The main topic of this paper is to study the impact 
of corporate governance on the market liquidity of listed companies' stocks. Using empiri
cal tests, Bacidore, Sofianos (2002) and Chung (2006) show that stocks of the companie
s in a more stringent external governance environment exhibit higher liquidity. Chen and 
Chung (2007),  Chung and Elder et al. (2010), Li et al. (2012), Prommin et al. (2014), Ta
ng and Wang (2015) use the data about listed companies in different countries to conduc
t their empirical examinations respectively, but they get an almost consistent conclusion t
hat there is a significant positive correlation between the quality of a company's internal 
governance and the level of the liquidity of its stocks. Existing literature focuses on seeki
ng empirical evidence that there is a correlation between corporate governance and liqui
dity of corporate stocks, while in this paper we mainly analyze the conditions and mecha
nisms by which corporate governance affects the liquidity of corporate stocks. The issue 
studied in this paper lies in the intersection of the two fields of securities investment and 
corporate governance. 
In the analysis of this paper, a company's executives and its controlling shareholders w
ho can control the company in a large degree are considered as a whole that is called as 
the  controlling community of the company. Compared with the controlling community, o
utside investors’ controlling power over the company is weak and they have less informat
ion about the company. Controlling community can expropriate the funds of the company
 or the interests of minority shareholders. This behavior is usually called as expropriation,
 and the value that the controlling community extracts from the company and the minorit
y shareholders is defined as agency costs. Therefore the benefits that outside investors c
an obtain from each share they hold tend to be less than the benefits that the controlling
 community can gain from each share they hold. In the following, we refer to the actual 
value that each share of the company brings for outside investors as the outside investor’
s value. 
In order to analyze the mechanisms by which corporate governance affects the liquidit
y of corporate stocks, we construct a model framework that contains the heterogeneity o
f beliefs among different investors. In our theoretical model, investors in the market are 
divided into two types: informed traders and noise traders. The participation of noise tra
ders in market transactions is an important condition for corporate governance to have t
he effect of improving the liquidity of the corporate stocks. In addition, our model also sh
ows that the increased degree of noise traders’ participation in market transactions will g
enerally increase the liquidity of stocks of listed companies in the market, which is aligne
d with the conclusions of many classic literatures. In the assumptions of our model, infor
med traders can accurately grasp all the information about the company, while noise trad
ers can accurately seize the information which is directly disclosed to the public or easily 
accessible. The scale of agency costs which are relatively secret and not directly disclose
d can’t be accurately known by them. Thus, informed traders can accurately know the va
lue of the corporate equity, while noise traders may have biased estimations on its value.
 The noise traders in our model are essentially "semi-informed" traders rather than compl
etely uninformed traders. Simply speaking, one important role of corporate governance i
n our model is to send noise traders a positive signal when they estimate the value of th
e corporate equity, thereby reducing the possibility that they overestimate the agency co
st of the company and the extent to which their estimations deviate from the actual valu
e that the equity can bring to them.  
The core part of our model building can be divided into four steps. (1) Using discounte
d cash flow method, we deduce the estimations of different types of investors on the out
side investors’ value of the corporate equity based on their own information about the ag
ency cost of the company. (2) Consider a situation where some holders need to sell a lar
ge amount of the corporate stocks in a short period of time. We assume that the transact
ion is conducted by open auction among all types of outside investors in the market, so a
n investor's estimation on the outside investors’ value of the corporate equity determines
 the upper bound of his bids. We derive the probability distribution of the market price of
 the stock after the transaction is completed under market equilibrium. (3) Based on the 
probability distribution of its price, we design an index to measure the liquidity level of th
e corporate stocks, as establishes a relationship between its liquidity and corporate gover
nance as well as the participation of noise traders in trading. (4) Based on these relations
hips, we analyze the effect of improving corporate governance on the liquidity of its stoc
ks. 
Finally, based on our theoretical model, we further demonstrates that corporate gover
nance and the degree of noise traders’ participation in trading have a synergistic effect o
n improving the liquidity of the corporate stocks : when the degree of noise traders’ parti
cipation in trading increases, the liquidity of stocks of listed companies in the market will 
generally increase, and the liquidity of stocks of companies with better governance tends
 to get a greater increase than those with poor governance; additionally, compared with 
the periods when the degree of noise traders’ participation in trading is low, improving th
e quality of corporate governance in the periods when this degree is high can improve th
e liquidity of the corporate stocks more greatly. 
To make our analysis clear, we divide companies into two categories based on the pow
er of the controlling community. For a company in the first category, there is no controlli
ng community that have controlled the company for a long time, and they can’t dictate t
he company absolutely. In this kind of company, the quality of corporate governance det
ermines the scale of the company's agency costs. We call this type of company as  gener
al-type company. In the analysis of general-type companies, our model framework includ
es three roles of corporate governance. The first effect is that corporate governance can 
determine the maximum scale of the agency costs extracted by the controlling communit
y. To be concrete, better governance can limit the scale of the company's agency costs t
o a relatively smaller range. The basis of containing this role in our model framework is t
he definition of corporate governance given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The second ro
le which has been emphasized in La-Porta et al.(2002) is that better governance can incr
ease the possibility that the controlling community's behavior of expropriation is captured
 and the intensity of the punishment for this behavior, which will accordingly affect their 
choice of the agency costs that they will extract from the company. The third role which 
has been mentioned above is that better corporate governance can send a positive signal
 to the noise traders who have incomplete information when they estimate the value of t
he corporate equity.  
For a company in the second category, there is a controlling community that has firmly
 controlled the company for a long time, so the value of its agency costs tends to be fixe
d. In this kind of company, the controlling community have absolute control over the co
mpany and can even determine the arrangement of corporate governance in the compan
y. Due to various reasons such as the requirements of the regulatory authorities, the con
trolling community also have to adjust the arrangement of corporate governance. Howev
er, they will try to ensure that the original scale of the agency costs that they can extract
 will not be restricted when they adjust the arrangement. Therefore, in such special com
panies corporate governance has a weaker impact on agency costs, while agency costs h
ave a stronger influence on the quality of corporate governance. We call this kind of com
pany as controlled-type company. Therefore, for controlled-type companies, the third afo
rementioned role of corporate governance should be included in our model framework, w
hereas the first and the second role should be excluded. 
We arrange the structure of this paper as follows: 
We first need to quantify the effect of corporate governance on its agency cost and an 
investor's estimation on the outside investors’ value of the corporate equity based on his 
own information, as provide a theoretical basis for further research on the core issue of t
his paper. We completed this work in section 2. Part of the analysis draws on the theoreti
cal framework of the existing literature. 
Based on the conclusions of section 2, we construct our theoretical model in section 3 
and 4. 
In section 3, we established a theoretical model that contains the heterogeneity of inve
stors’ beliefs. By this model, we give an explanation for the mechanisms by which corpor
ate governance generate an effect of improving the liquidity of the corporate stocks, as 
well as derive an important condition for apparent occurrence of this effect. 
In Section 4, based on the model framework in Section 3, we further demonstrate that
 the strength of the effect that corporate governance improves the liquidity of the corpor
ate stocks is affected by the degree of noise traders ‘participation in stock trading. Likewi
se, the strength of the effect that noise traders’ participation in trading improves the liqui
dity of stocks will also be affected by the quality of corporate governance. In other words,
 we prove that corporate governance and noise traders’ participation have a synergistic e
ffect on improving liquidity of stocks. 
The analysis in parts 3 and 4 is targeted at general-type companies. 
In Section 5, we focus on controlled-type companies and do relevant research. Our the
oretical model indicates that the conclusions we draw in Sections 3 and 4 are still valid fo
r this particular type of companies. 
In Section 6, we summarize our analysis and give some policy recommendations. 
 
2. The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Outside 
Investors’ Value of the Corporate Equity 
 
For general-type companies, the main process by which corporate governance affects t
he outside investors’ value of their Equity is shown below: 
 
Figure 1 
 
As shown in Figure 1, firstly, corporate governance determines the scale of the agency
 costs in a company; then, the agency cost will affect the outside investors’ value of the c
orporate equity. Additionally, outside investors will also utilize their information about the
 agency cost of the company when estimating the outside investors’ value. There are ma
ny important factors that can affect the outside investors’ value of the corporate equity, 
and agency cost is one of them. The higher the  agency cost of a company, that is, the c
ontrolling community's expropriation of the outside investors’ interests is more serious, th
en the lower the outside investors’ value of the corporate equity, that is, the earnings obt
ained by the outside investors will be reduced. 
In section 2.1, we model the process of corporate governance determining actual agen
cy costs, using an analysis framework similar to La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes et al. (20
02). In section 2.2, we model the process of agency costs affecting the outside investors’
 value of the corporate equity and an investors' estimation on the outside investors’ value
 based on his own information. In this way, we quantitatively characterize the impact of 
corporate governance on the outside investors’ value in this section and provide a basis f
or further research on the core issues of this paper. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Agency Costs 
The analysis in this paper proceeds under continuous time settings. Consider a represe
ntative company in the economy. Referring to the assumptions given by Morellec and Nik
olov et al. (2012, 2018), We set the production function of the company at the time of t 
as: 
       
 ,      . 
   is the total output of the company at the time of t, and    is the total amount of fun
ds which it invests in production.   denotes the company's capital depreciation rate, and 
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  denotes the borrowing rate.   and   are all constants.    represents the technical shock
 of the company at the time of t, and it is a random variable. Like the assumption of Mor
ellec and Nikolov et al. (2012, 2018), the products produced by the company at the time 
of t will sell out simultaneously and one unit product is sold at a unit price. The cost of pr
oducing one unit product is    which can be treated as the cost shock at the time of t an
d is also a random variable. We define         . Similar to the assumption of Morellec
 and Nikolov et al. (2012, 2018), we assume that the stochastic process         is govern
ed by a stochastic differential equation which is: 
                                                                                                                                               
        is a standard Brownian motion which reflects the uncertainty of productivity an
d cost shocks. Therefore the profit of the company at the time of t is:  
         
          
Now, we introduce the agent cost which is an important variable into our model in the 
form that has been used by morelec, Nikolov, et al. (2018), La porta, Lopez de silanes, et
 al. (2002), Shleifer, wolfenzon (2002). They assume that the controlling community can 
extract a constant share   of the company’s profits at each moment and the share   is re
garded as the agency cost, where        . To be concrete, it means that the cash flow 
which the controlling community expropriates from the company at any time t is        a
nd the remaining profit            is then distributed among all shareholders of the co
mpany on a pro rata basis. We suppose the controlling community holds a fraction   of t
he equity of the company totally. Here   is exogenous and determined by its history or it
s life-cycle. Thus, the total value of the cash that the controlling community can obtain at
 any time t is                    .  
Next, we introduce the factor of corporate governance into the model. In order to refle
ct the inhibitory effect of corporate governance on agency costs, we assume that
        , that is, the extraction proportion of the controlling community can’t exceed 
  , where         . Therefore,    is a parameter which reflects the quality of corporate 
governance. For a company, the smaller    is, the better its corporate governance is and
 the stronger the ability to restrain its agency costs. The literature we mentioned above a
ssumes that   and    are constant and don’t change with time. This assumption is used i
n this paper for the convenience of analysis. In order to fully reflect the role of corporate 
governance in our model, we use the methods of La porta, Lopez de silanes, et al. (2002)
 to consider the punishment given to the controlling community for their illegally extracti
ng corporate funds. Suppose that in a company, the share of profits extracted by the con
trolling community is ρ, 
The probability of their expropriation being caught and revealed is        , where 
        . That is, the larger the expropriation ratio ρ that the controlling community ch
ooses, the greater the possibility that they will be punished; the worse the company’s cor
porate governance, the greater the possibility that they will be punished. The punishmen
ts here include not only the fines imposed on them and the loss of their positions in the c
ompany, but also the damage to their reputation in the industry. 
After their expropriation is caught and revealed, they were punished with       for eac
h unit of the value they extracted, where         . That is, the worse the company’s c
orporate governance, the less the punishment imposed on them.  
Therefore, the expectation of the value that the controlling community is fined at t tim
e t is:  
  
     
       , where       
 
           
. Obviously,         . The expectation 
of the value obtained by the controlling community at this time is: 
                    
  
     
      
               
  
     
       
           
Because the controlling community has control over the company, they can determine 
the total amount of capital    that the company puts into production at each time and th
en the output of the company. Their goal is to maximize their benefits at every time. The
refore, at any time t, they should choose the optimal ρ and    to solve the optimization p
roblem: 
                                                 
    
          
  
     
       
                                      
In fact, solving this optimization problem is equivalent to solving the following two opti
mization problems: 
                                                                      
      
         
  
     
                                                      
and  
                                                                         
    
      
                                                                       
The first order condition of the optimization problem (2.3) is: 
    
  
     
   
Then ρ becomes a function of the parameter    of corporate governance: 
                                                                             
   
 
                                                                     
Then ρ is an increasing function of the parameter   , that is, the company with poor g
overnance has relatively high agency cost. This is intuitive and aligned with the basic the
ory of corporate governance. By equation (2.5), we  can characterize the impact of corpo
rate governance on the company's agency cost. 
The solution to the optimization problem (2.4) is: 
                                                                        
   
 
   
 
 
      
 
                                                               
Solution (2.6) maximizes the expectation of  the benefits of the controlling community 
at the time of t, as well as the profits of the company at this time. 
 
2.2 Agency Cost and Outside Investor’s Value of Stocks 
   When the controlling community adopts the optimal choice (2.5) and (2.6), the expe
ctation of their benefits is: 
                
  
     
        
           
   
If the number of the company's shares is   , then the benefit for each share held by the
 controlling community at the time of t is: 
     
    
      
         
 
       
 
     
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
    
The total income of all the outside investors at the time of t is: 
                           
           
   
                        
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
    
Then the benefit for each share held by an outside investor at the time of t is: 
     
       
      
     
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
    
Due to the existence of agency costs, the amount that the controlling group would ben
efit more than outside investors from each share held is: 
      
     
    
 
     
       
                                           
                           
         
 
 
 
     
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
      
                                 
             
  
 
     
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
      
      can be regarded as the benefit of control which has been extensively studied by 
existing literature. It can be easily deduced that       decreases with the improvement o
f corporate governance (i.e., the decrease of   ). 
   For the convenience of later discussion, we define a stochastic process: 
   
     
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
    
So at the time of t, the benefit that each share brings to an outside investor is: 
                                                                     
     
       
                                                           
According to the expression (2.1) of the stochastic process        , using the Ito formul
a can derive that the stochastic process         is governed by the following stochastic dif
ferential equation: 
                        
     
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
    
where   
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.    and    represent the initial states of the sto
chastic processes         and        , respectively.  
We derive the solution of the above stochastic differential equation: 
       
    
  
         
It’s generally recognized that investors always estimate the value of the corporate equi
ty based on the relevant information they have obtained. We assume that all outside inv
estors can accurately know the company’s parameters which are often directly disclosed 
to the public or easily accessible, including equity concentration θ,   ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,    an
d  . Additionally, most of the information about the governance arrangement of listed co
mpanies is publicly disclosed, and outside investors can learn about the quality of corpor
ate governance of these companies through the information, so we assume that all of th
em can accurately know the parameter    of corporate governance. 
On the other hand, we assume that some of them are not able to precisely know the s
cale of the agency cost   because it’s relatively secret and not directly disclosed. Thus th
ere may exist heterogeneity between different investors' estimations on the agency cost 
of one company. In our model, investors who can accurately know the scale of the comp
any’s agency cost are regarded as informed traders, and the other investors are regarde
d as noise traders. That is, the difference between noise traders and informed traders in 
our model lies in the accuracy of knowing the scale of agency costs. 
We set a representative outside investor's estimation on the agency cost of the compa
ny as   which may be biased from the real value ρ. Then by equation (2.7) we deduce th
at he tends to estimate the income brought by each share held by himself at the time of 
t as             . Now we calculate        which is defined as his estimation on the 
value of each share of the company at the time of t. We calculate        by discounting a
ll the cash flows obtained by holding one share after the time of t, and the discount rate 
of outside investors is set to γ. 
            
             
  
 
              
                         
                  
  
 
  
                        
                   
  
 
 
                                                                  
    
  
           
  
 
 
                                                                    
     
   
    
    
  
                                                                 
The second equal sign of the above formula is derived by Fubini's theorem. From the p
erspective of discounted cash flow method, the actual outside investor’s value of each sh
are at this time should be: 
                                                                       
     
   
    
    
  
                                                       
since the real agency cost of the company is ρ. All the words "value" that occur in the 
rest of this paper refer to the outside investor’s value of the corporate stocks. 
Remark: The agency cost itself is a piece of information that is difficult to acquire direc
tly. Although we follow La porta, Lopez de silanes, et al. (2002) to express the real agenc
y cost as a function of the parameter    of corporate governance by equation (2.5), in fa
ct, noise traders usually can’t use    to precisely infer the agency cost of the company. T
here are two main reasons. (1) In reality, the determinants of a company's agency cost a
re complex and diverse, including the history of the company and its life-cycle. The ways 
in which various factors affect the agency cost are also changeable. Formula (2.5) is only
 a simplified and imprecise description of the scale of agency cost. (2) Due to poor infor
mation and knowledge, it is difficult for noise traders to fully seize the factors that can inf
luence the agency cost and the way in which these factors jointly determine the agency c
ost. 
 
3. the Effect of Corporate Governance on the Liquidity of 
Stocks 
 
3.1 Investors' Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Basic Setting of Our Model 
   In this section, taking the existence of noise traders in market transactions, we analyze
 the mechanisms by which corporate governance affect the liquidity of the corporate stoc
ks. The analysis in this section is for general-type companies, and we will give the corres
ponding conclusions for controlled-type companies in section 5. 
   Now We consider a representative listed company with the parameters described in Se
ction 2. We assume that there exist both informed traders and noise traders in the marke
t. The number of informed traders and noise traders in the market is    and   , respecti
vely.    and    are both constants that do not change with time. Informed traders have 
complete information, including the real agency cost of the company and the actual outsi
de investor’s value of the corporate equity. Because they are completely informed, it’s dif
ficult for them to lose money in trading and they tend to make some profits. Therefore, 
we assume that all of them are always willing to use their information to participate in th
e trading of the corporate stocks. Noise traders without complete information bear a cert
ain degree of risk of loss in trading, so not all noise traders are always willing to participa
te in trading. Furthermore, the number of people willing to participate in trading is rando
m and potentially changes over time. Thus, following the assumptions in Easley, Kiefer a
nd O’hara et al. (1996), we suppose that the number of noise traders willing to participat
e in market transactions over time follows a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. The large
r the arrival rate λ, the higher the degree of noise traders' participation in trading and th
e more active they are in the market. In the following we refer to λ as the degree of nois
e traders’ participation in trading.  
We focus on a generalized situation in which a shareholder of the company has to sell 
out the company’s stocks held by him at the time of    because of his urgent need for ca
sh. The total number of the shares held by him is    . For the convenience of analysis, 
we assume that each investor in the market can only buy n shares of the company until t
he time of   . Therefore, at the time of   , the shareholder will sell his shares by M deals
 that he will make with different investors, and each deal consists of n shares of the com
pany. The price of each deal is determined by the open auction between investors who a
re willing to participate in trading at that time. We assume that at a certain time point    
before the time point of   , some transactions on the company’s stocks have occurred in 
the market, as have caused that all the noise traders who are willing to participate at the
 time of    have purchased ample shares in these transactions and left the market at the 
time of   . Between the time of    and   , no transaction on the  stocks of the company 
occurs. So the investors who will participate in the open auction at the time of    include: 
(1) all informed traders in the market, the number of which is   ; 
(2) noise traders willing to participate in trading in the time interval [  ,   ], the number 
of which is denote by   . 
According to our assumption,    obeys a Poisson distribution with parameter λ    , w
here         .    is the length of the time interval between these two transactions. 
We define        . In addition, we assume that no trader in the market can become
 a large shareholder of the company and join the controlling community of the company 
through these transactions, so they only care about the outside investor’s value of each s
hare at the time of   . Let   denote the value of each share when there is no agency cos
t in the company. By equation (2.9), we derive 
          
 
   
    
    
  
 
          
If the controlling community extract the cash flow of the company to the maximum ext
ent permitted by the constraints of governance mechanisms of the company, that is, thei
r expropriation ratio reaches the upper bound   , by equation (2.9) the value of each sh
are should be: 
           
      
   
    
    
  
 
                   
By equation (2.9) again, the real value of each share should be:  
  ρ       ρ  
   ρ 
   
    
    
  
 
             ρ    
  ρ  can also be seen as the fair value of each share. Informed traders deem the value o
f each share to be V (ρ) correctly. If a noise trader estimates the agency cost ρ as ρ , by f
ormula (2.8) we deduce that his estimation on the value of each share at the time of    s
hould be: 
        ρ   
   ρ  
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It can be inferred ρ        , since noise traders precisely know the parameter    of c
orporate governance. Because their estimations tend to be biased and the deviations bet
ween their estimations and the real size ρ are random, we assume that all noise traders' 
estimations on the size of agency cost obeys a uniform distributed on the interval of 
       and are mutually independent. Therefore,    obeys a uniform distributed on the int
erval of         and are mutually independent. 
 
3.2 Equilibrium Price of Each Share 
In the process of this open auction which will complete at the time of   , the following
 conditions usually hold.  
Condition 1. Every investor can observe the bids of all the traders in the market.  
Condition 2. Before the time of   , the number of times each trader can modify his bid i
s unlimited.  
Condition 3. Noise traders participating in the open auction don’t know whether there a
re informed traders in the market.  
Condition 4. The seller doesn’t know any bidder's estimation on the value of each share,
 i.e.   .  
Condition 5. At the time of   , the M deals are concluded one by one in the form of ope
n auction. Traders don’t ex ante know how many shares the seller will sell.  
Condition 6. Use   to denote the price to pay for one share. If an investor believes that
 buying a stock makes him neither lose nor gain based on his information (i.e.     ), he
 won’t choose to buy it.  
 We also need to consider a special case in which the number of the noise traders who
 are willing to participate in trading is so small or the number of the  shares that the shar
eholders need to sell is so large that        . This case essentially means that sellin
g pressure in the market is heavy and the liquidity that noise traders can provide is not e
nough. In this case, all traders willing to participate in trading have bought n shares and 
quit the market, whereas the seller still holds some shares that haven’t been sold. We m
ake the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. If the seller who has to sell out his stocks at the time of    quotes an as
king price of  , this price can effectively attract other noisy traders who were not willing t
o participate in trading to buy the remaining shares from the seller at this time. 
Because in the belief of noise traders in the market, the probability that the actual valu
e of each share is lower than   is 0, buying at the price of   is unlikely to make them los
e and may bring them earnings. Thus, Assumption 1 is reasonable.  
We use the following proposition to explain what the market price     of each share wi
ll be after all the M deals are concluded under market equilibrium at the time of   . In fa
ct,     is the equilibrium price of each share in the last deal (i.e. the M-th deal).  
Proposition 1. Suppose that there are totally N traders bidding in this open auction, wh
ere   is a constant positive integer. Their estimations on the outside investor’s value of e
ach share of the company in descending order is:                    . Suppose that t
he M deals are concluded under market equilibrium, then 
(1)       
      if    ; 
(2)       if    .  
Proof.  
For the convenience of our discussion, the trader who estimates the value of each shar
e as       is recorded as the trader      for          . 
In the state of market equilibrium, any trader who changes his bid alone won’t increas
e his benefits. In other words, the market is not in equilibrium if a trader in the market c
an increase his earnings by modifying his own bid. Now we demonstrate that the first de
al will be closed by the trader      at the price of   
    for each share.  
The first deal won’t be concluded at a price of       which is greater than   
   , otherwis
e the market can’t be in equilibrium. (1) The price of     for each share is unlikely to be bi
dden by a trader      where      , as means that traders other than the trader      won’t 
bid     for each share. The trader      believes that buying each share at the price of     w
ould bring him a loss, because his estimation on the value of each share satisfies that 
               . (2) It is also impossible that the price of     for each share is bidden by t
he trader     , because there still exists some space for him to lower his bid for the purpo
se of increasing his benefits. For instance, it’s profitable for him to lower his bid to a cert
ain price of      which satisfies that   
            . By the bid of   
 
  for each share, he can 
also close the first deal because the other traders whose estimations on the value of eac
h share are not larger than       won’t give a bid larger than     .  
    Additionally, the first deal won’t be concluded at a price of     which is lower than   
    
for each share, otherwise the market can’t be in equilibrium. There are at least two trade
rs whose estimations on the value of each share is greater than    , since   
             .
(1) If the trader who bids     for each share and will conclude the deal is the trader     , t
he trader      can give a higher bid of     which satisfies that   
           . By this bid, t
he trader      can replace the trader      to close the deal and get a profit of   
            in his belief. (2) If the trader who bids     for each share and will conclude the
 deal isn’t the trader     , the trader      can give a higher bid of     which satisfies that 
             . By this bid, the trader      can replace the trader who bids     for each sha
re to close the deal and get a profit of               in his belief. 
Therefore, the first deal can only be concluded at the price of       for each share and t
he trader who gives this bid and closes this deal must be the trader      . It is not possibl
e for the other traders to give bids which are greater than or equal to       for each share.
 If the trader      lowers his bid to  ’ (i.e.  ’    
   ) for each share, the trader      will giv
e a bid which is higher than  ’ but lower than       for each share to replace him to buy t
he stocks and make a profit. If the trader      raises his bid, his profit will decrease. After 
the first deal is concluded, the trader      will quit the market and not participate in the tr
ansactions. 
According to a similar analysis, we can deduce that the second deal will be concluded b
y the trader      at the price of   
    for each share. It can be proved by mathematical ind
uction that for any integer   that satisfies              , the k-th deal will be closed
 by the trader      at the price of   
      for each share. Therefore, if    , we can deriv
e that       
      because the last deal (i.e. the M-th deal) will be concluded at the pric
e of         for each share. 
 If N = M, the k-th deal will be concluded by the trader      at the price of   
      for k 
= 1,2, ..., M-1. Then all of them will quit the market, which results that only one trader w
ho is the trader      will bid for the last n shares. His optimal strategy is to give a bid of  
 for each share, which ensures that he can conclude the last deal. (1) If he gives a bid th
at is lower than  , the seller can then quote an asking price of   and sell the last n share
s to another trader in the market according to Assumption 1. (2) On the other hand, givi
ng a bid which is higher than   can reduce his profit. Thus, we deduce that       if 
   . 
 If    , it’s obvious that       by Assumption 1. 
 
By our settings,     is obviously a random variable, as is also consistent with reality. 
If the selling pressure at the time of    is so small that     , it’s obvious that 
      ρ  by Proposition 1. This means that the seller can sell each share held by him at
 a price that is not lower than the fair value of each share. Since this paper focus on the l
iquidity of stocks, we assume that the selling pressure at this time is so large that     
 in the rest of this paper. 
 
3.3  Our Measurement of Liquidity of Stocks 
It has been defined above that   ρ  is the actual outside investor’s value of each share
 of the company at the time of    and     is the market price of each share after the shar
eholder sells out all the     shares held by him at this time. If       ρ  , we define 
    
   
  ρ 
 
In fact,   which is obviously a random variable denotes the discount rate of the market p
rice of each share at the time of    relative to its real value. In the following, we refer to 
  as the discount rate. We define   
   ρ
  ρ
. Because it’s obvious that       according to
 Proposition 1, we derive 
    
 
  ρ 
   
    
  ρ
   
So the range of   is       . Keeping the time interval   , the degree of noise trader's pa
rticipation λ and the trading volume     fixed, the larger the discount rate  , the larger 
the extent to which the price of each share deviates downwards from its fair value after t
he trading. A discount rate of   suggests that the seller obtained only 1-s of the real valu
e of each share in the last deal, that is, he lost s ∙ V (ρ) for each share. In order to chara
cterize the liquidity level of stocks in our model framework, for any constant number    i
n      , we can define 
       λ          
   
  ρ 
                  ρ   
and 
         λ   
          λ                 λ   
                                           λ        
  
          λ  which can be seen as a function of   ,    and λ is the natural logarithm o
f the probability that the discount rate of the market price of each share relative to its fai
r value is larger than    after the trading. For a fixed   , the greater the          λ , the 
higher the level of liquidity of the stocks.  
Consider two specific listed companies which are company A and company B. For any fi
xed    in      , their levels of liquidity are         
  λ  and         
  λ  respectively. If 
        
  λ          
  λ  holds for any         , one can claim that the stocks of comp
any A are more liquid than that of company B. 
For a representative trader whose estimation on the value of each share at the time of
    is   , use         to denote the probability that the discount rate of his estimation  
  r
elative to the real value   ρ  is larger than   , i.e.  
            
          ρ    
where    can be any constant number in      . For any          , we derive 
                                                   
        ρ       
       
   
ρ      ρ
  
                               
For any          , it’s obvious that          .  
Now We calculate our liquidity indicator of the stocks under the case of the open aucti
on that we have elaborated in Section 3.1. If     , then          . All informed
 traders estimate the value of each share as     . Thus, by Proposition 1 we can deduce 
that       
          , which means that      
   
    
     . So, For any         , 
we derive 
             
This means that trading in small quantities doesn’t tend to cause a sharp decline in the m
arket price of the stocks. If     , we have the following conclusion: 
Proposition 2. At the time of   , for any          , the probability that the discount rat
e of the market price of each share relative to its fair value is larger than    is: 
           
      
  
 
   
                                                                                                     
                                            
      
        
                  
 
         
   
 
 
   
  
  
     
 
where       . For any          ,  
             
Proof. 
(1) Focus on the case in which          . If    which is the number of noise traders par
ticipating in bidding satisfies that     , then   which is the total number of traders pa
rticipating it satisfies that     and we can derive                  by Proposition
 1.  
If     , then     and we can derive       
      by Proposition 1. We still set th
at the estimations on each share of all the   traders in descending order is:  
                     
We additionally set that the estimations on each share of all the    noise traders among 
all the   traders in descending order is: 
                   
Notice that all the informed traders estimate the value of each share as its actual value
      which satisfies that                . So, if   
                , we can derive
 that                 and it follows that                  . Likewise, if  
      
          , it’s obvious that    
             and it follows that                   . 
Therefore, we can deduce that                        
                 .  
For convenience of our deduction, we define that        ρ . 
                   ρ    
                        
              ρ                   
  
     
 
          
 
   
          
  
     
                    ρ          
          
 
   
          
  
     
                   ρ           
          
 
   
                                                                                                             
                                        
            ρ   
             
 
   
 
  
     
 
  
 λ    
  
 
   
   λ                                                                                                           
                           
 λ    
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(2) By proposition 1, it’s obvious that      . Thus, for any constant    in       , we deri
ve 
       λ          
   
  ρ 
          
 
  ρ 
             
 
For convenience of the following discussion, we define that 
                                                    
  
  
 
   
       
     
        
           
 
   
  
     
                            
Then, for any constant    in       , we derive 
       λ   
          λ                         
                                                    
  
It can be seen from Proposition 2 that        λ  and          λ  have nothing to do w
ith the starting and ending time points    and   , but are related to the interval time    
between them. 
 
3.4 The Effect of Corporate Governance on Liquidity of Stocks 
For any constant number    in        , by equation (3.1), the probability that a noise tra
der's estimation    on the value of each share relative to its real value is greater than    i
s 
          
                 
  
  
Recall that in section 2.1 we clarify that in general-type companies the controlling co
mmunity will adjust the agency cost ρ as the quality of corporate governance changes. T
hus, ρ can be seen as a function of    and the form of this function has been given by e
quation (2.5), i.e.  
ρ     
  θ
 
       
In this part, we need to impose a technical and widely used condition to the function 
    . This condition is that      is a concave function of   , as means that the marginal ag
ency cost extracted by the controlling community is decreasing with the deterioration of 
corporate governance (i.e. the increase in the upper bound    of the company’s agency 
cost).  
Proposition 3. An increase in the degree of noise traders’ participation in trading (i.e.  )
 will enhance liquidity of stocks generally in market. Improvements of corporate governa
nce of the company have the effect of increasing the liquidity of its stocks if    .  
Proof. 
We use 
       
  
 and 
       
  
 to represent the partial derivatives of        with respect to it
s first and second independent variable.   
    
       
  
 
  
      
  
 
   
     
  
  
 
   
       
     
        
              
 
   
  
     
 
    
     
        
           
 
   
  
     
 
  
    
      
 
   
     
  
  
 
   
       
     
        
              
 
   
  
     
 
    
     
        
           
 
   
  
     
 
  
  
  
 
   
     
  
  
 
   
    
       
         
        
              
 
   
  
     
    
     
        
              
 
   
  
     
 
        
     
        
           
 
   
  
   
   
     
        
           
 
   
  
  
  
  
       
    
          
              
 
   
  
     
 
       
    
            
              
 
   
  
     
    
     
        
           
 
   
  
   
 
    
     
  
   
  
        
           
 
   
 
  
  
  
       
  
        
                
 
   
  
   
 
       
     
        
             
   
   
  
   
    
     
        
           
 
   
  
   
 
  
  
    
    
  
        
                
     
        
           
 
   
  
   
 
         
     
        
             
 
   
  
   
  
     
        
            
  
   
  
     
  
        
                    
     
        
             
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
    
             
  
  
       
      
  
   
 
  
             
  
  
     
  
  
   
 
  
          
  
                                                                                                                                  
Thus, we derive that 
       
  
  . For any constant    in       , we deduce that 
            
  
  
 
              
 
               
  
       
(1) Consider the case where    ρ      ρ . Under this case, it’s obvious that 
  
   ρ
  ρ
   , which implies that        λ    and          λ    . Therefore, the liq
uidity of the stocks of the company is highest under this case. 
(2) Focus on the case where    ρ      ρ .  
       
  
    
     
          
             
 
   
  
     
 
                                            
     
            
             
 
   
  
     
 
    
       
        
           
 
   
  
   
    
       
        
           
   
   
  
   
 
                  
       
        
           
  
   
 
                          
   
  
  
        
      
  
   
 
                
          
  
                                                                                                                        
If    , then 
       
  
  . 
   We define                     . It’s obvious that            . On the other h
and, by the concavity of the function     , we can deduce that            
       
    
   
 
          . As a result, we derive that   
         
So,  
        
   
 
                          
   
 
               
   
   
Based on the above deductions, it follows that 
                       
            
   
  
 
              
 
               
  
 
        
   
                       
if    .  
                                                                    
 
3.5 Summarization 
   Now we explain the economic intuition which underlies the construction of our theoreti
cal model.  
   For noisy traders who can’t precisely know the actual value of the corporate equity by t
he reasons of their incomplete information about the company, better corporate governa
nce can send them positive signals which reduce the heterogeneity between their beliefs 
and the extent to which their estimations deviate from the reality as well as have the effe
ct of reducing the probability that they underestimate the value of the equity and strengt
hening their confidence to invest in the stocks of the company. The noise traders who ha
ve received the signals will tend to give a higher bid for each share, thereby providing liq
uidity for the stocks of the company in the secondary market. The existence of noise trad
ers is an important condition for corporate governance to improve liquidity of the stocks. 
Based on Proposition 3, we have the following corollary.  
Corollary. Under the case where there are no noisy traders in the market or they do not
 participate in any transactions, the effect of corporate governance on the liquidity of the
 stocks of the company tend to be extremely weak. 
Proof. 
If    , for any constant    in       , we can derive 
               
  
 
             
  
   
by equation (3.4). Then we conclude that 
           
   
   by equation (3.5).  
 
4. Synergistic Effect 
 
 4.1 Corporate Governance and the Effect of noise trading on liquidity 
In proposition 3 we have deduced that an increase in the degree of noise traders’ parti
cipation in market transactions will promote the liquidity of stocks, as is consistent with E
asley, Kiefer and O’hara et al. (1996). We call this phenomenon as the effect of noise tra
ders’ providing liquidity for stocks. Consider a company with a parameter    of corporate
 governance. When the degree of noise traders’ participation in trading is    which satisfi
es that     , the liquidity level of its stocks should be             . If this degree then i
ncreases to    which satisfies that      , the liquidity level will be lifted to             .
 The increase is 
                                         
            essentially quantifies the effect of noise traders’ providing liquidity for the st
ocks of this company. What we are interested in is whether             changes with th
e quality of corporate governance   .  
Suppose that there are two listed companies in the market and their parameters of cor
porate governance are respectively   
 
 and   
  which satisfy that   
 
   
 . Additionally, th
e other parameters of them are almost the same. Based on the framework of the theoret
ical model in Section 3, we draw the following conclusion: 
Proposition 4. For companies with better corporate governance, the effect of noise trad
ers’ providing liquidity for their stocks is more intense. In other words, when more noise 
traders begin to participate in market trading, the liquidity level of the stocks of these co
mpanies will increase more greatly compared to the companies with worse corporate gov
ernance, i.e.           
 
            
  .  
Proof.  
Since   
                                       
            
  
  
  
     
in order to prove that          
 
           
  , we only need to demonstrate that  
                                                                   
         
 
   
  
 
         
    
  
                                                   
holds for any positive number  . We define         
      
       
  
  , then 
            
  
  
 
              
 
               
  
    
 
  
              
                         
Let 
       
  
 denote the partial derivative of        with respect to its first independent v
ariable, then 
                           
             
     
  
  
               
 
               
  
 
        
   
                   
We have proved that                in Proposition 3.  
    On the other hand,  
       
  
  
       
  
 
  
       
        
    
 
       
  
       
  
   
By equation (3.3), we can deduce that  
        
    
                
                
  
  
          
        
    
 
       
  
       
  
 
   
  
  
   
 
   
    
     
        
           
 
   
  
     
                
                                                            
                
  
 
              
     
          
 
              
  
 
  
  
                  
 
   
  
                                        
  
        
                            
 
   
  
     
 
                                                                                                                    
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
  
  
       
 
   
  
  
      
 
   
  
    
  
     
 
   
  
                   
  
        
                    
            
            
 
   
  
     
 
   
  
     
 
                                                
    
        
            
 
   
  
     
 
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
  
      
 
   
  
    
  
     
 
   
   
            
            
 
   
  
     
  
                                                
    
        
            
 
   
  
     
 
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
    
  
   
   
  
    
  
     
 
   
   
                
        
   
   
  
   
  
                                                
    
        
            
 
   
  
     
 
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
    
  
  
   
   
 
    
  
        
                
        
 
   
  
   
  
                                        
                
        
  
   
    
    
        
            
 
   
  
     
 
                                                                                                                  
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
    
  
       
                
        
 
   
  
   
                
        
  
   
 
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
    
  
      
         
  
  
 
 
           
 
   
  
  
            
  
 
       
      
  
   
 
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
    
  
      
         
  
 
            
  
 
     
  
  
   
  
  
            
  
     
 
              
  
  
            
  
    
            
  
     
    
Therefore, we have derived that 
       
  
  . We can further infer that 
            
     
   b
y equation (4.2) and it follows that equation (4.1) holds. The proof of this proposition is c
ompleted.    
 
  Based on Proposition 4, we can infer that when the market trend is upward and various
 investors become more active in investment, the liquidity of the stocks of the companies
 with better corporate governance will increase more than those with worse corporate go
vernance. On the other hand, when the market trend is downward and the activity of var
ious investors in investment is weakened, the liquidity of the stocks of the companies wit
h better corporate governance may decrease more than those with worse corporate gove
rnance, but by Proposition 3 we can affirm that the liquidity level of the former is still hig
her than the latter under this situation.   
 
4.2 Noise Trading and the Effect of Corporate Governance on liquidity 
In proposition 3 we have deduced that an improvement in corporate governance of a c
ompany will promote the liquidity of its stocks, as is consistent with the empirical evidenc
e of Chung, Elder, Kim(2010). We call this phenomenon as the effect of corporate govern
ance on liquidity of stocks. Suppose that the degree of noise traders’ participation in tradi
ng is  . For a representative company with a parameter   
  of corporate governance, the 
liquidity level of its stocks should be         
     at this time. If the corporate governance
 in the company is improved and the parameter of corporate governance consequently d
ecreases to   
  (  
    
 ), the liquidity level will be lifted to         
    . The increase is 
                   
             
        
           essentially quantifies the effect of corporate governance on the liquidity of its 
stocks. What we are interested in is whether            changes with the degree of noise
 traders’ participation in trading  .  
Suppose that there are two stages of the market. In the first stage the degree of noise
 traders’ participation in trading is    and in the second stage this degree rises to    (i.e. 
     ). The company can improve its corporate governance and reduce the parameter f
rom   
  to   
  in one of the two stages. Based on the framework of the theoretical model 
in Section 3, we draw the following conclusion: 
Proposition 5. The effect of corporate governance on the liquidity of the company’s sto
cks will become more intense when more noise traders participate in market trading. In 
other words, improving corporate governance in the stage when more noise traders parti
cipate in trading can increase the liquidity of the company’s stocks more greatly compare
d to the stage when less noise traders participate, i.e.          
            
  .  
Proof. 
  Since 
                   
             
        
            
   
  
 
  
 
     
in order to prove that          
            
  , we only need to demonstrate that 
                                                               
           
  
   
 
           
  
   
                                                   
holds for any positive number  . We define         
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Let 
       
  
 denote the partial derivative of        with respect to its second independent 
variable, then 
                             
          
 
   
     
  
  
               
 
               
  
 
        
   
                     
It has been proved that                in Proposition 3.  
  On the other hand, 
       
  
  
       
  
 
  
       
        
    
 
       
  
       
  
   
Using equation (3.3) and (3.4), it is easy to verify that 
        
    
 
        
    
  
It has been shown that  
      
        
    
 
       
  
       
  
     
in Proposition 4. Therefore,  
      
        
    
 
       
  
       
  
    
As a result, 
       
  
   and we can further derive that 
          
 
  
     
   by equation (4.4). It
 follows that equation (4.3) holds. The proof of this proposition is completed. 
 
   Combining Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, we can conclude that corporate governanc
e and the degree of noise traders' participation in trading have a synergistic effect on inc
reasing the liquidity of a company's stocks. 
 
5. Conclusions for Controlled-type Companies 
 
First of all, we suppose that for any listed company in market, noise traders don’t kno
w whether it is a general-type or controlled-type company.  
The conclusions in section 3 and 4 are for general-type companies, while in this sectio
n we focus on whether these conclusions is applicable for controlled-type companies whi
ch are special. 
The company of this type tends to have a relatively fixed agency cost the size of which
 is denoted by   , and its parameter    of corporate governance is also largely determin
ed by its controlling community. The controlling community has tight control over the co
mpany, as causes that the probability of their expropriation being revealed (i.e.      ) a
nd the punishment for their expropriation (i.e.      ) tend to be negligible. Therefore, th
e agency cost   of the company will not be determined by the quality of corporate gover
nance in the way we have elaborated in section 2.1. The parameter    which is determin
ed by the controlling community should satisfies       to ensure that their expropriatio
n can’t be restricted by corporate governance. For the company of this kind, we treat its 
agency cost    as an exogenous parameter which is determined by the history and life-cy
cle of the company. However, it’s easy to verify that the agency cost can still affect the o
utside investors’ of its stocks in the way we have analyzed in section 2.2, that is, the for
mulas (2.8) and (2.9) are still valid for the company. 
For the company in this kind, by formula (3.1), the probability that the discount rate o
f a noise trader’s estimation    on each share relative to its real value      is larger than 
   (         ) should be  
                                                                       
           
  
                                                      
for any          ,          . Here, we deem the agency cost    constant. Though    
satisfies that      , it doesn’t change with the parameter    of corporate governance, 
as differs from general-type companies. We have the following conclusions for controlled
-type companies. 
Proposition 6. Suppose that     . At the time of   , for any          , the probabilit
y that the discount rate of the market price of each share relative to its fair value is large
r than    is: 
                                     
where        and        are defined by equation (3.2) and (5.1) respectively. Additionally, 
for any          ,            . 
 
  The proof of Proposition 6 is almost identical to that of Proposition 2. Based on Proposit
ion 6, we can derive the following proposition which is similar to Proposition 3. 
Proposition 7. An increase in the degree of noise traders’ participation in trading (i.e.  )
 will enhance liquidity of stocks generally in market. Improvements of corporate governa
nce of the company have the effect of increasing the liquidity of its stocks if    . 
Proof. 
The process of its proof is almost the same as that of Proposition 3. We only need to n
otice that it still holds that            for any          , though there is some differenc
e between        defined by equation (5.1) and that defined by equation (3.1).  
 
Proposition 7 indicates that for the company of this special type, corporate governance
 still has the effect to increase the liquidity of its stocks, though the constraint of corporat
e governance on the scale of its agency cost is very weak and its agency cost tend to be 
fixed. Simply speaking, the reason is that better corporate governance can send positive 
signals to noise traders who have incomplete information and need to estimate the value
 of its stocks, as reduces the probability that they underestimate the value and motivates
 them to provide liquidity for its stocks with a higher bid. This is also the economic intuiti
on that underlies our deduction in this part. 
In addition, the conclusions of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 also hold for the compa
nies of this special type and the proofs of them are almost identical to those of  Propositi
on 4 and Proposition 5, so we will not repeat them. 
 
6. Conclusions and Suggestions 
 
Summarizing the analyses and derivations in this paper, we conclude that good corpor
ate governance has the effect of increasing liquidity of stocks of listed companies, but an
 important condition for apparent occurrence of this effect is that there exists noise trade
rs with incomplete information in the market and they are involved in trading to some ex
tent. Our theoretical model further implies that an increase in the degree of noise traders’
 participation in trading can enhancing this effect. Additionally, it has been widely accept
ed that an increase in the degree of noise traders’ participating in trading has the effect 
of promoting the liquidity of stocks. Our model also implies that an improvement in corpo
rate governance can reinforcing this effect. Thus, we reveal that corporate governance a
nd the degree of noise traders' participation have a synergistic effect in elevating the liqu
idity level of stocks. 
For investors, buying and holding the stocks of the companies with good corporate gov
ernance is a potential channel to improve the liquidity of their portfolios, especially durin
g the periods when noise traders are active in investment. For those investors who have 
to sell out a large number of stocks shortly, it may be sensible for them to give priority to
 selling the stocks of companies with relatively better corporate governance. This strateg
y is likely to reduce their loss caused by the large sales volume in a short time. For a liste
d company, improving corporate governance is a potential channel to increase the liquidit
y of its stocks in the secondary market, especially during the periods when noise traders 
are active in investment. 
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